Sowing the Seeds: Why do some armed groups socialize civilians more than others during civil war?

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Abstract: What explains variation in the intensity with which armed groups seek to socialize civilians into their ideology? Answering this question provides key insights for how armed actors exercise power and the degree to which ideas affect behavior and authority construction during war. The study of civil war initially focused largely on military dynamics, while the growing body of literature that examines ideology and socialization during war mostly limits its gaze to intra-armed group processes. This paper seeks to expand this literature to consider the ideational interaction between armed groups and civilians, which forms a key competent of rebel governance along with violence and service provision. An inductive, theory-building design compares the Naxalite Rebellion in India (1967-72) and the Shining Path Insurgency in Peru (1980-1992). Within the universe of Marxist rebel groups, these two groups shared very similar Maoist ideologies, making them an ideal paired comparison. This research design also demonstrates that variation in socialization intensity is not endogenous to ideology writ large. However, this variation can be explained by variation in combatant socialization, how groups value education, and the degree to which groups understand civilian participation as crucial for achieving victory.

Introduction

For rebel groups fighting irregular wars, civilian support is a crucial resource. Rebels

need supplies and intelligence from civilians, but there is a limit to what they can achieve

through coercion alone. Womack, writing on the Communist movements in Vietnam and China

prior to their victories, argues, 'If compliance is coerced from the masses by the party, the cost of

policing will greatly reduce the benefit of mobilization. Even policies favourable to the masses

are more expensive to implement if the masses remain passive' (Womack 1987, p. 488). For

groups with ideological goals, civilian political education and mobilization can also represent a first step in achieving their desired social order. This type of socialization is useful to armed groups because it can influence community norms rather than discrete individuals and change how civilians self-identify rather than simply how they behave (Checkel 2017, p. 594)[1]. But investing in socializing civilians can direct needed resources away from military objectives or risk giving away crucial intelligence by involving civilians too closely. Recent research has established the frequency and types of rebel governance, from maintaining order to resolving conflicts and provisioning services (Mampilly 2011, Stewart 2018). Armed groups also engage in the ideological socialization of civilians, and despite documenting specific instances, past literature has not provided generalizable theories for explaining variation in the intensity of armed groups' civilian socialization (Wood 2008, p. 539–61, Mampilly 2011, 2015, Staniland 2014, Bateson 2017, p. 634–47).

To theory-build on this question, under what conditions to armed groups socialize civilians, I select two cases, the Indian Naxalites (1967-1972) and the Peruvian Shining Path (1980-1992) that exhibit puzzling variation in socialization intensity. While the Shining Path heavily socialized civilians, the Naxalites did not. Existing theories explain variation in aspects of rebel governance through resource availability, ideology, civilian resistance, and whether groups are secessionist, but none of these factors vary in these two cases (Weinstein 2007, Mampilly 2011, Arjona 2016, Hoover Green 2018, Stewart 2018, p. 205–26).[2] Therefore, a new theory is needed to explain this variation in socialization intensity.

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[1] A longer explanation of the development of the concept of socialization and how I define the term appears at the end of the next section.

[2] One factor that does vary is the level of indiscriminate violence, but the effect on civilian socialization intensity goes in the opposite direction one would expect, as the Shining Path both more intensely socialized civilians and committed indiscriminate violence than the Naxalites.

I primarily argue in this paper that two necessary but not sufficient conditions and two variables lead to civilian socialization. Necessary conditions for civilian socialization are an initial lack of civilian mobilization to support the armed group and the ideological socialization of combatants. For armed groups to engage in the political education of civilians, they must value reading- and writing-based education in general, and for groups to provide opportunities for nonviolent civilian participation, they must see civilian mobilization as a key strategic component. In my theory section, I explain this theory in more detail as well as the specific historical events that led the Shining Path and the Naxalites to vary on these dimensions.

This paper proceeds as follows. First, I build on recent scholarship on ideology and socialization during war to provide a framework for conceptualizing ideological socialization of civilians, and how it is related to rebel governance. Second, I explain my research design and justify my case selection. Third, I develop a theory to explain variation in armed group socialization of civilians. Fourth, in two qualitative case studies, this paper analyses the variation in socialization intensity by armed groups across conflicts. These two cases were chosen due to their level of documentation and their illustration of differing socialization levels. A short final section summarizes the paper, emphasizes the paper's contributions, and proposes avenues for future research.

Ideological Socialization of Civilians During War

As civil war scholarship has proliferated, scholars have proposed modifications to Kalyvas' rational understanding of civilian behaviour (Kalyvas 2006). These works together provide a richer picture of civilian behaviour than the first generation of rationalist civil war scholarship in two important ways. First, civilians' theoretically relevant behaviour is not limited

to a binary conception of armed group support, and includes a wider range of behaviours between total collaboration and resistance (Petersen 2001, Wood 2003, Arjona 2016, p. 46). Second, civilian's wartime actions occur for reasons beyond incentives provided by armed groups, allowing the possibility that pre-war experiences and beliefs are important for explaining behaviour (Wood 2003, Lyall, Blair, and Imai 2013, Balcells 2017).

A second strand of literature focuses on armed group institutions and rebel governance. While the existing literature helps to theorize the socialization of civilians as a key institution of rebel groups, there are not sufficient answers for why it occurs or why it succeeds. Instead of patterns of control influencing violence against civilians, Weinstein argues that groups with access to lootable natural resources attract lower-motivation recruits that groups without such resource availability (Weinstein 2007). These different types of recruits create different rebel institutions, with less motivated recruits being less likely to do political work and more likely to abuse civilians. While presenting a parsimonious theory, its utility is limited for socialization strategies. Non-abuse of civilians does not imply active socialization, and neither the Shining Path in Peru's Central Highlands, nor the Naxalites, had access to lootable resources, but still demonstrated variation in the intensity with which they socialized civilians (Weinstein 2007, p. 93-5, Lovell 2019, p. 373).

Further works have sought to complicate Weinstein's monocausal explanation of rebel group behaviour and conceptualize institutions behind a coercive apparatus. Mampilly criticizes Weinstein's approach for oversimplifying and overdetermining complex conflict, and instead argues that the nature of the pre-conflict relationship between state and society, the ethnic composition and goals of rebel leaders, and endogenous nature of the war shape rebel governance (Mampilly 2011). He sees security provision, justice provision, and public goods

provision as characterizing the potential domains of rebel governance, and that providing all three will produce legitimacy among the civilian population, but does not explain why we should or should not see variation in civilian socialization efforts (Mampilly 2011, p. 14-17). Similar to Mampilly, Arjona's conception of rebel governance focuses on the administrative aspects of governance (Arjona 2016). She argues that while rebel groups with long time horizons would always prefer to implement their own form of governance, but if existing civilian institutions are effective and legitimate, they will be unable. Rebel groups able to establish this dominant form of governance, which Arjona terms 'rebelocracy', will be more likely to receive support from civilian populations (Arjona 2016, p. 163). While her theory implies we should be more likely to see ideological socialization of civilians under rebelocracy, it is not clear what other conditions have to be true for that to be the case. Finally, Stewart differentiates between rebel groups that provide inclusive versus exclusive goods to civilian populations. She argues that secessionist rebels are more likely to govern inclusively, as they care more than non-secessionist rebels about legitimating themselves in the eyes of domestic and international observers (Stewart 2018, 205-7). Just as the work of Arjona and Mampilly enhances descriptive and causal theories of certain aspects of rebel governance, Stewart's work significantly increases our understanding of the rebel service provision. However, it leaves aside civilian political education by armed groups and cannot explain variation between the non-secessionist Shining Path and non-secessionist Naxalites.

Like the provision of security and public goods, the provision of socialization is a distinct armed group institution that merits examination. Hoover Green's work on exercising restraint in wartime uses political education of combatants as an independent variable to explain violence restraint (Hoover Green 2016, 2018). Her work on socialization, however, focuses on how

combatants are socialized rather than civilians. Given that combatant socialization is producing a particular outcome in violent restraint, it is unclear how socialization of civilian will affect behaviour when the desired attitudinal and behavioural outcomes are less narrowly defined.

A third important strand of work has introduced ideology as a causal, independent variable during civil war (Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood 2014, Schubiger and Zelina 2017, Leader Maynard 2019). Ideologies coded as 'extreme' are more successful at motivating mobilization (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010, p. 6, Costalli and Ruggeri 2015). More specifically, Marxist groups tend to recruit more women, direct violence more intentionally, pick stronger opponents, and govern more than non-Marxists (Balcells and Kalyvas 2014, Hoover Green 2016, 2018, Wood and Thomas 2017). While Islamists are less likely to recruit women that other groups, they are also more resistant to government repression than nationalist groups (Toft and Zhukov 2015, Wood and Thomas 2017). This literature does an excellent job of comparing the effects of ideology writ large, but has trouble explaining variation within specific ideological groupings, such as Marxism and Islamism. Additionally, the dependent variables in these studies are restricted to the traditional topics in the study of armed groups: mobilization, the execution of violence, and success. These works provide only limited lessons on how ideology affects relations with civilians, or why we would observe variation in socialization practices by the Maoist Naxalites and Shining Path.

A final important strand of literature seeks to understand the socialization processes undertaken by armed groups and their effects (Wood 2008, Checkel 2017, Cohen 2017, Gates 2017, Hoover Green 2017, Manekin 2017, Moncrief 2017, Rodgers 2017, Wood and Toppelberg 2017). Broadly, this body of literature has three main conclusions. First, socialization can seek three distinct types of change in its targets: bare compliance, role-playing in specific situations,

and internalization of socialized ideas (Checkel 2017). Second, similar to the work summarized in the paragraph above, authors writing on socialization of combatants find that it can create intra-group cohesion (Cohen 2017, Gates 2017). Third, multiple authors argue that when socialization is weakly institutionalized or coupled with informal socialization that presents opposing ideas, it is unlikely to produce compliance with or belief in official doctrine (Hoover Green 2017, Manekin 2017, Moncrief 2017, Rodgers 2017, Wood and Toppelberg 2017). These studies add considerable descriptive depth to how armed groups carry out socialization and why it succeeds or fails, but mostly focus on the socialization of members of armed groups. The socialization relationship between armed groups and civilians is left unexamined.

There are a few exceptions, which do address the ideological socialization of civilians. Mampilly and Wood's articles demonstrate the range of socialization practices that armed groups undertake, while Bateson shows that socialization can have varying effects on different populations (Wood 2008, Mampilly 2011, Bateson 2017). These three articles demonstrate what strategies armed groups can use to socialize civilians and that its success is variable, it is still not clear how frequent socialization processes are, how they vary in intensity and success, and what explains this variation.[3]

In short, despite the existence of several promising theories that explain variation in rebel governance and wartime socialization, they are not sufficient for explaining variation in ideological socialization intensity of civilians by armed groups. Either ideological socialization of civilians does not figure at all in these theories, or existing theories cannot explain specific

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[3] In the introduction to the Journal of Peace Research's special issue on wartime socialization, Checkel (2017, p. 598-9) writes, '…, the special issue falls short theoretically, not at the level of individual contributions but in advancing general arguments on socialization and violence. Methodologically, challenges both ethical and practical remain in measuring social processes.'

variation in the socialization intensity of civilians across variable levels of civilian victimization, extent of governance, and ideology.

This paper uses the definition of ideology proposed by Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood (2014, p. 215), 'By ideology, we mean a more or less systematic set of ideas that includes the identification of a referent group (a class, ethnic, or other social group), an enunciation of the grievances or challenges that the group confronts, the identification of objectives on behalf of that group (political change – or defence against its threat), and a (perhaps vaguely defined) program of action.' The modern study of socialization was initially largely within the field of sociology, focusing on two groups of people: office workers and children in wealthy countries (Dawson and Prewitt, and Dawson 1977, Van Mannen and Schein 1979, Arnett 1995, Morawski and St. Martin 2011, Bateson 2017).[4] Despite differences in subject matter, this paper follows in the tradition of this body of work, and uses Checkel's (2017, p. 594) definition of socialization, '…a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community, the endpoint of which is internalization. Socialization, in other words, is a process whose intended result is not simple behavioural adaptation, but a deeper change in an actor's sense of self.'[5] Therefore, in the language of Wood and Toppelberg (2017), I focus exclusively on top-down socialization from armed groups to civilians. Horizontal socialization, that is socialization between civilians, or even bottom-up socialization, from civilians to armed groups, may be occurring, but my focus in this paper is in variation in socialization intensity of civilians, by armed groups.[6]

Research Design

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[4] This paper however, focuses solely on socialization that is projected outward from the armed group to civilians for reasons that go beyond recruitment of combatants.

[5] This definition specifically draws on the work of Dawson, Prewitt, and Dawson (1977, p. 9).

[6] For an example of bottom-up socialization during wartime, see Kaplan 2013.

To theory-build on the socialization of civilians by armed groups, this paper uses two most similar case studies of armed groups. This type of controlled comparison has a long tradition in the social sciences, and allows for the creation of causal theories (Mill 2002, Slater and Ziblatt 2013). My paper is inductive in the sense it seeks to generate generalized theory about the causes of civilian socialization by armed groups. However, it begins with an extant theoretical and conceptual framework, as opposed to using case studies to alter existing conceptual boundaries.[7]

Cases eligible for this paper had to fulfil three central criteria: held territory, fought irregularly (as opposed to conventionally), and had a Marxist ideology.[8] Armed groups had to have held territory to maximize their ability to socialize civilians, which becomes much more difficult in contested areas. Groups had to have fought irregularly rather than conventionally due to the importance of civilian support in guerrilla warfare, and therefore the relevance of civilian socialization (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). Despite the range of groups that carry out socialization, holding the group type constant aids comparison, which better allows for an inductive approach to creating descriptive and causal theories, and therefore this paper focuses only on Marxist groups, and specifically Maoist groups. This decision to study Maoist groups is made for the sake of research design, but does not indicate scope condition.[9] Non-Marxist rebel groups, such as the Taliban, have also engaged in sustained socialization of civilians through political education (Johnson 2017, Liuhto 2016). Furthermore, my usage of the term 'ideological' does not strictly refer to political ideologies such as Marxism, but includes belief systems based in religion, ethnicity, and nation. As Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood (2014, p. 215)

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[7] See Soss 2018.
[8] This paper relies of Kalyvas and Balcells' (2010) coding of Marxist groups and draws cases from that sub-sample.
[9] However, fighting irregularly and holding territory are scope conditions of my argument, and therefore my argument only applies to armed groups.

indicate in their parenthetical in the definition's first clause, the referent group can be variously defined, and therefore my theories also apply to groups that are religious and nationalist.

In this paper, I endeavour to show that the intensity of ideological socialization is not endogenous to ideology writ large through a comparison of two groups with very similar ideologies. Within the universe of global manifestations of Maoism, both the Naxalites (1967-1972) and the Shining Path (1980-1992) attempted to rigidly impose Mao's analysis of pre-revolutionary, non-democratic China onto their own ethnically-divided democracies (Lovell 2019, p. 459).[10] Though the groups were not identical, they shared six specific similarities that make them an ideal paired comparison. First, both groups were Maoist, implying an idealized relationship with civilians, a rural-based strategy, and a belief that revolution was possible not because of the presence of certain structural conditions, but through the force of sheer revolutionary will (Lovell 2019, p. 33, 57-8).[11] Second, the groups' adoption of the Maoist line was controversial internationally, domestically, and with other communist factions during their existence (Banerjee 1980, p. 82, 134, Starn 1995, Degregori 2012, p. 73, Mohanty 2015, p. 63). Third, both saw the peasantry as their main constituency, and rural inequality as their motivating issue (Duyker 1987, Starn 1995, p. 408, Degregori 2012, p. 94, 115, 134, Mohanty 2015, p. 42, Shah and Jain 2017, p. 1166). Fourth, both groups proffered simplistic answers to complex issues, maintaining that the victory of the revolution would solve all social problems without

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[10] In keeping with the most similar research design, only two other significant, armed manifestations of Maoism occurred in democracies: the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) in Colombia and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN-M). The EPL were a relatively small and marginal group in Colombia, which also does not have the same ethnic divisions as India or Peru. The CPN-M's insurgency occurred in the context of a new and unstable democracy, and was also heavily influenced by the both the Naxalites and the Shining Path (Lovell 2019, p. 388, 393).

[11] In her global history of Maoism, Lovell (2019, p. 8-9, 47) notes that the doctrine of 'Maoism' is notoriously slippery, both because Mao's canonized thinking was contradictory, but also because it was applied wildly differently in different contexts. Setting these difficulties aside, Lovell describes Maoism's most basic tenets as anti-imperialism, rural-based armed struggle, a one-party state coupled with anarchic mass participation, belief in an entirely agency-based theory of revolution, and a vague feminism (Lovell 2019, p. 57).

specifying how (Banerjee 1980, p. 38, Starn 1995, p. 418, Mazumdar quoted in Damas 1991, p. 257-9, Degregori 2012, p. 104). Fifth, both believed that the killing of class enemies, or more concretely, the assassination of landlords, was the main task of the revolution (Mazumdar quoted in Damas 1991, p. 257-8, Starn 1995, p. 408-9, Das 2015, p. 89-90, Lovell 2019, p. 34). Sixth, both were hierarchal and authoritarian, adopting a thoroughly vanguardist approach (Degregori 2012, p. 103, Mohanty 2015, p. 98).[12]

Evidence presented from this paper comes mainly from secondary sources in addition to some direct quotes from combatants in the two insurgencies. While the literatures on these two groups is fairly robust in comparison to some other less-well-documented insurgencies, the number of social science works that address the group's ideologies or their relationships with civilians is fairly limited, and I made my best attempt to read everything that fit that description.[13]

I measure socialization intensity by observing the degree of socialization that actually took place, not the degree of socialization that was intended by the armed group.[14] My criteria for doing so is based on the degree to which the groups performed two tasks that together constitute civilian socialization during wartime: educating civilians in the group's ideology and creating opportunities for civilian participation in group activities (excluding the execution of

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[12] They did differ in two ways worth mentioning that I do not expand on in the theory section. The Shining Path were more willing to exercise violence against non-landlord civilians, and while the Naxalites may have tolerated such violence, they did not encourage it (Banerjee 1980, p. 203, Degregori 2012, p. 149). Second, the Naxalite ideology developed in the context of sustained political organizing, whereas the Shining Path's ideology developed in an academic setting divorced from everyday political engagement (Degregori 2012, p. 74, Paul 2014, p. 51-2).

[13] While there has been a recent proliferation of works on the Naxalites, much of it focuses on later incarnations (after 1972) of the Naxalite movement, and therefore the number of works on the early Naxalites is quite limited (Shah and Jain 2017). I focus only on the Naxalite movement up until 1972, because soon after the death of initial leader Charu Mazumdar, the group splintered into numerous organizations that did not comprise a coherent single group (Lovell 2019, p. 367).

[14] In other words, if a group attempted a high degree of socialization, but failed to carry it out, I would code it as a case of low socialization intensity. Furthermore, groups may not intend to socialize civilians, but do so nonetheless because they create socializing institutions with other end goals in mind.

violence).[15] My argument separates out political education from nonviolent opportunities for participation because they are qualitatively different and also have different determinants. However, they should not be viewed as having nothing with each other, because together they constitute complementary socialization activities. Political education gives civilians the raw ideational materials to understand the world through the eyes of the socializing armed group, whereas nonviolent activities for participation gives civilians the chance to put these ideas into practice and see themselves as active agents of the armed group's belief system.[16] For the purposes of this paper, I define the presence of both tasks as indicating a high intensity of socialization, the presence of one as indicating a medium intensity, and the presence of neither as indicating a low intensity.[17]

In my case studies for this paper, I determine that the Shining Path engaged in a high degree of socialization, while the Naxalites engaged in a low degree of socialization.[18] The Shining Path demonstrated a sustained commitment to educating populations under its control in its ideology for reasons that went beyond recruitment. Additionally, ad hoc tasks such as postering and the creation of local governance committees allowed for civilians to be involved in the group's everyday activities (Weinstein 2007, p. 188, Degregori 2012, p. 118). The group's socialization efforts were at their highest in the first three years of the conflict but declined over

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[15] I make no claims about how successful socialization was in changing civilian belief and behavior. Instead, I focus solely on the amount of effort the groups invested in civilian socialization.

[16] While both political education and nonviolent civilian participation may not be fully voluntary activities for civilians, coercive institutions can still have powerful socializing effects (Kelman 1989, Bateson 2017, Hoover Green 2018).

[17] For the sake of simplicity, my paper measures socialization with two binary measures of the presence or absence or political education and nonviolent avenues for civilian participation.

[18] My separate theories for why groups political educate civilians and why they provide opportunities for nonviolent participation implies that some groups should do one and not the other, even if in my case studies, the Shining Path did both and the Naxalites did neither. The Taliban are a good example of a medium intensity case, because while they politically educated civilians through religious leaders, public letters, and media engagement, they did not provide civilians nonviolent opportunities for participation (International Crisis Group 2008, Liuhto 2016, Johnson 2017).

time due to military defeats. Alternatively, the Naxalites can be considered a case of low socialization because the group did not politically educate civilians or offer nonviolent participatory activities for civilians (Banerjee 1980, p. 109, 167-8, Paul 2014, p. 86).

Theory: Explaining variation in civilian socialization intensity

In this paper, I argue that the variation in civilian socialization intensity between the Shining Path and the Naxalites can be explained with two necessary but not sufficient conditions and two causal factors. The first condition is that for an armed group to socialize civilians, civilians under the group's rule must not already be fully mobilized in support of the group due to civilian disagreement or apathy. If civilians already uniformly supported the armed group and mobilized on their behalf, the armed group would have little incentive to pursue any type of socialization. Simply, it would not be needed.[19] Second, an armed group must socialize its combatants as a pre-condition for civilian socialization. Cadres unschooled in a group's ideology themselves will be unable to pass ideological messages on to civilians.

Two additional factors determine whether groups engage in political education and the creation of nonviolent participation for civilians. The presence of political education is determined by whether group leadership values the type of reading- and writing-based education common in primary and secondary schooling. If group leaderships understand school-based education as having intrinsic merit, they will likely create education programs that encourage political learning. These programs can range from the creation of a formal education system for children to political media aimed at adults.[20] Here, the link between group intentionality and

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[19] I thank an anonymous reviewer for making this point.
[20] Huang finds that only 30% of rebel groups in the cross-national Rebel Governance Dataset set up an educational system, whereas 65% had a media/propaganda arm (Huang 2016).

socialization implementation is quite straight-forward: groups that believe that education is important in general are likely to politically educate civilians.

A second factor determines whether groups provide the second facet of civilian socialization: opportunities for nonviolent participation. Armed groups differ in how they view civilians for strategic reasons. Some see civilians as a strategically important because they can be counted on to provide material resources, intelligence, and manpower. The perception that civilians are strategically important to victory will consequently lead groups to create avenues for participation. Other armed groups see civilians as a liability, as they are concerned that civilians lack the requisite dedication to the cause and whose needs will distract from the military conflict at hand. These groups will seek to create a strict dividing line between combatant and civilian, and will not provide opportunities for civilian participation. The logic here is crucially different from the logic of why political education occurs, because while nonviolent participation is a socializing experience for civilians, the impetus for creating these opportunities has little to do with socialization. Instead, civilian socialization through participation is the by-product of an armed group's strategy to achieve victory.

The Naxalites and the Shining Path varied on both their valuing of reading- and writing-based education and their understanding of the strategic importance of civilian mobilization. This variation can be explained by minute differences in the organizational and intellectual origins of the groups. These differences are specific to the histories of the two groups, and therefore I do not generalize these differences outside of my two case studies. However, I contend that while the determinants of variation in my two main variables, may be contingent by group, it is ultimately these two variables, valuing of education and strategic importance of civilian participation, that explain variation in civilian socialization.

The differences between the Shining Path and the Naxalites' approach to education in general derives from their leaders' varying background. The Shining Path's Abimael Guzmán main power base was a university through his role as a professor, and he built his organization through the university's teacher training program. Guzmán was a relatively marginal figure in the Peruvian Communist Party, an instead came to power as a dissident intellectual, meaning that the institutions of the school and the university became central to how the Shining Path organized. Mazumdar was the opposite (Starn 1995). His background was as a party member in the Communist Party of India (CPI), which by the mid-1960's, was in the process of fracturing. This dynamic, in conjunction with Mazumdar's desire to lead the most radical faction, caused Mazumdar to pre-emptively sabotage potential challengers (Mohanty 2015, p. 148). His comparative advantage over others was his reputation for holding a fierce intellect and willingness to attack internal opponents, both verbally and physically (Lovell 2019, p. 351, 365). Encouraging intellectual study of any sort would have put Mazumdar's primacy at risk, and in keeping with his authoritarian leadership style, he called for the boycotting of schools in 1969 without consulting fellow CPI(ML) leaders.

Guzmán and Mazumdar also varied on how they understood the strategic importance of civilians because of their different readings of Maoism. Both men subscribed to the idea that the core of the revolutionary organization should be kept small, but they differed on the role for those outside the vanguard (Lovell 2019, 33). For Guzmán, even if the peasantry could not be trusted to carry forward the revolution themselves, they would form the majority of the group's members and its social base (Starn 1995, p. 205, 208). He saw Peru to be identical to China pre-revolution, and hoped to replicate Mao's peasant-based political and military strategy (Lovell 2019, p. 336). Mazumdar, despite also being a disciple of Mao, differed significantly from

Guzmán on this question. Citing the teachings of Lenin and Stalin, he argued that the primary

tasks for Naxalite cadre involved creating a covert, underground organization that could not be

dismantled through a few arrests. Trade union and peasant organization work were secondary,

due both to the dangers of 'economism' and government repression (Mazumdar quoted in Damas

1991, p. 243-245).[21] Additionally, his interpretation of Maoism's revolutionary was not the same

as Guzmán. Rather than a military strategy that became by achieving control in rural areas before

moving to the cities, Mazumdar believed that militant agitation would result in a spontaneous,

popular mobilization and the 'area-wide' seizure of power (Mazumdar quoted in Damas 1991, p.

252). In other words, civilians would only be active participants just prior to achieving victory.

My argument is summarized in the diagram below.

Determinants of civilian socialization by armed groups

Necessary but not sufficient conditions

1. Civilians are not already fully mobilized in support of the armed group
2. The armed group's combatants are ideologically socialized

Causal processes

Contingent differences	Key variable	Outcome
Naxalites: Intra-party competition (−)	Group leadership values reading- and writing-based education	Creation of schooling systems and political media
Shining Path: Academic origins (+)		

Contingent differences	Key variable	Outcome
Naxalites: Belief in "area-wide" seizure of power (−)	Group leadership sees civilians as strategically important to victory	Creation of opportunities for nonviolent civilian participation
Shining Path: Maoist rural-and peasant-based military strategy (+)		

In the next section, I provide historical case studies of the Shining Path and the Naxalites.

Each case study will begin with an overview of the group and its insurgency to provide some

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[21] 'Economism' was focusing on short-term economic objectives at the expensive of long-term revolutionary goals.

historical context.[22] Second, I will describe the origins and content of the group's ideology.

Third, I will describe the group's relationship with civilians and socialization practices.

Shining Path case study

The Shining Path insurgency began in the rural areas of Ayacucho Region, Peru in 1980. Initially, the rebellion was mostly ignored by the government of President Fernando Belaúnde, allowing it to control about 80% of the province's territory (Degregori 2012, p. 133). Only three years later did the government initiate a harsh military crackdown, increasing the levels of violence perpetrated by both sides. In 1985, the country's new president, Alan García, attempted to reign in human rights abuses, leading to more selective counterinsurgent violence and the arming of peasant patrols, known as *rondas campesinas* or *autodefensas* (Weinstein 2007, p. 85-7, Degregori 2012, p. 25).[23] Military pressure was effective in forcing the Shining Path out of its Ayacucho Region strongholds northward, into the central highlands above Lima, and eastward, into the country's Amazon region (Del Pino 1998, p. 164, Stern 2012, p. 5). As the conflict entered its second decade, the Shining Path mostly abandoned its rural focus, and moved into Lima's shantytowns. With every move away from its initial rural base in Ayacucho, the group became more violent and indiscriminate (Degregori 2012, p. 149, 153). The capture of leader Abimael Guzmán (known within the group as Presidente Gonzalo) in 1992, along with much of the Shining Path's top commanders, led to the decline of the group (Degregori 2012, p. 27).

The institutional origins of the Shining Path, like the Naxalites, lie in the Sino-Soviet split. In response to the fracture, the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) divided into two factions,

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[22] I follow Gerring (2004, 342) in understanding a case study as an '…an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units.'
[23] *Rondas campesinas* existed prior to the García government (Del Pino 1998, p. 164).

one loyal to the USSR and another, the Peru Communist Party-Red Flag (PCP-BR), loyal to China. This faction included the Ayacucho Regional Committee, helmed by future Shining Path leader Abimael Guzmán. Guzmán's faction then itself split off from the PCP-BR in the early 1970's but did not bring with them supporters from outside Ayacucho Region. At this point, Guzmán's Maoist faction, which would go on to become the Shining Path, was an isolated fringe group due to its shunning of electoral politics, trade union activity, and other conventional forms of political organizing (Degregori 2012, p. 74).[24] The faction did gain a foothold at Ayacucho's San Cristóbal de Huamanga National University, which served as the incubator for the Shining Path's elite prior to the initiation of armed conflict (Lovell 2019, p. 322).[25] The specific rhetoric of the Shining Path proved popular at the university due to its directness. The group's particular brand of Maoism offered simple answers to complex social questions in straight-forward language (Starn 1995, p. 404, 418, Degregori 2012, p. 92-104). An anthropology student recalled the influence of the university's Shining Path-promoted Marxist textbooks (Quoted in Lovell 2019, p. 318), 'Can you imagine what that means to a twenty-five-year-old kid? It was to learn to handle a secret language, an abracadabra that let me open all the sesames.'

Guzmán's influence at San Cristóbal de Huamanga National University was exerted through his roles in charge of the undergraduate core curriculum throughout the 1960's and as the first director of the university's teacher training program, which had about a quarter of total students (Lovell 2019, p. 322). The return of teachers to rural areas following graduation, and Guzmán's ability to control where teachers were placed, would provide the Shining Path with

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[24] The Shining Path's political thought was nearly entirely created by Abimael Guzmán. Beginning in the early 1980's, recruits were required to sign a letter of submission to 'Gonzalo thought', the term within the organization to describe Guzmán's doctrine, using his *nom-de-guerre* Presidente Gonzalo (Degregori 2012, p. 88).
[25] A quarter of the university's faculty had traveled to China, which is a quite remarkable number for a university in one of the poorest parts of Latin America at the time (Lovell 2019, p. 315, 322).

links to peasants and a large, willing base of socially-embedded propagandists (Palmer 2017, p. 434).

The ideology of the Shining Path had its roots in transnational Marxism. Guzmán, who had received political and military training in China during the Cultural Revolution, styled himself the fourth sword of Marxism, after Marx, Lenin, and Mao (Starn 1995, p. 400, La Serna 2012, p. 140). Guzmán actively cultivated a cult of personality, and was known throughout the organization for his oratory abilities (Starn 1995, p. 404), 'At a boarding house on Pukacruz Street, later known to local pundits as *El Kremlin*, Guzmán delivered long talks on dialectical materialism and scientific socialism, and earned the nickname of *Dr. Shampú* for his ability to 'brainwash' listeners.' Accordingly, the Shining Path was deeply vanguardist, believing that while peasants would be the major fighting faction, it was the vanguard that would correctly apply Marxist principles (Starn 1995, p. 408). Guzmán saw himself as creating a specifically Peruvian Marxism in the tradition of the early Peruvian Marxist and intellectual José Carlos Mariátegui, but also leaned heavily on Maoist thought (Starn 1995, p. 410), 'More specifically, the style of the Shining Path mimicked the Cultural Revolution in a relentless politicisation of personal behaviour and public life.' Despite the major racial divide in Peruvian society, Guzmán ignored it entirely in favour of class struggle, calling race an 'epiphenomenon' of capitalism (Starn 1995, p. 412-5).[26] While the group's view of indigenous traditions was generally derisive, in practice, there was variation in whether the group's low-level militants incorporated local customs (Theidon 2013, p. 333). The Shining Path's novel ideology and fealty to a transnational Marxist ideology meant that there was initially a significant gap in political beliefs and social organization between the Shining Path's peasant base and the group's combatants.

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[26] Guzmán's view of history was laid out in an extensive 1979 speech entitled 'Three Chapters of Our History' (Degregori 2012, p. 79-80).

The main innovation the Shining Path brought to the Marxist tradition was an extreme focus on the redemptive power of violence (Degregori 2012, p. 155), 'For Shining Path, violence was not merely the midwife but rather the mother and motor of history.' In Guzmán's own words, the group's members must prepare for the 'blood bath' that the revolution would bring (Degregori 2012, p. 142). When this doctrine was fully implemented, the group's violence was both gruesome and pervasive. The Shining Path often chose family members to carry out fatal punishments on their enemies, or simply killed entire families for the actions of a single member (La Serna 2012, p. 143, 151-2). Violence by the group became more intense over time, both to deter defection and to recruit followers, as the group was pushed out of Ayacucho Region (Del Pino 1998, p. 164-6).

Despite the often-narrow nature of the Shining Path's political thought, education was held in high esteem throughout the groups' varied activities. Guzmán, styled as Presidente Gonzalo, was portrayed as an intellectual in the group's propaganda. Until military defeats fractured the organization's recruitment strategies, admittance into the group as a combatant required passing stringent ideological tests, and was a slow, gradual process (Weinstein 2007, p. 84, 118-9, 151). Preparation for these often occurred at long ideological training camps, such as the month-long camp held in March 1980 in which Guzmán gave long speeches and cadres studied Marxist texts (Degregori 2012, p. 81-2). Combatants were therefore well-versed in the group's ideology.

The high value attached to education with the Shining Path meant that it also e engaged in significant political education of civilians. The armed struggle did not preclude attempts to infiltrate schools, but rather accelerated them. A 1992 estimate, long past the heyday of the group, suggested that 60% of children attended schools that were influenced by the Shining Path

(Brooke 1992). Total influence was rarer, but still significant (Brooke 1992), 'In areas of uncontested Shining Path control, probably not more than 10 percent of Peru, guerrillas force their own curriculum on schools, while allowing teachers to receive their state salaries. These schools often keep a false set of grade books for regional school superintendents and a real set for guerrilla commanders.'

The Shining Path's upper-level membership was mostly white and middle class, presenting a challenge for a group that wished to go to the peasantry for support (Starn 1995, p. 405). Local teachers and their secondary school students provided the solution to the challenge of political education, linking the university-educated cadres lodged at San Cristóbal de Huamanga National University to rural Ayacuchans. Teachers, who were held in high esteem in rural areas, served as messengers for the group's doctrine. Teachers often held semi-clandestine extra classes with selected students that schooled them in Guzmán's political thought and the need for armed struggle (Cordero 1998, p. 353, Degregori 2012, p. 75-6, 81, Theidon 2013, p. 195). These lessons were quite effective at instilling potential supporters with the 'critical idea' of Peru that sought to re-interpret Peruvian history through a Marxist framework directly opposed to what had previously been taught in government schools (Degregori 2012, p. 136). Secondary school students, thoroughly schooled in Shining Path ideology, then provided the bulk of initial, low-level recruits (Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2003, p. 568-9, Weinstein 2007, p. 117, Degregori 2012, p. 115, La Serna 2012, p. 144). The Shining Path offered these students both a radical, actionable interpretation of Peru and the opportunity for social mobility. Through these new recruits, the group was able to reach out and politically educate the broader population through kinship and community ties (Degregori 2012, p. 136-7).

Accordingly, Guzmán's (quoted in Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2003, p. 565) fealty to education's importance stretched beyond the organization's membership, 'One has to educate the masses: we should not educate only children, but also adults. The criterion that guides education should be Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. We see how the government is abandoning the peasantry, thus, we should fill that gap.'[27] These efforts were termed 'moralizing campaigns' by the group, and helped create a relationship between the group's leadership and peasant base somewhat severed by the group's strict hierarchy (Theidon 2013, p. 195).

The group's layered membership structure was divided into roughly four levels, with the leadership at the top and civilians physically incapable of military activity at the bottom (Theidon 2013, p. 334). This organizational structure included civilians in a command military hierarchy and intended to blur the combatant/civilian distinction. Initial activities, like postering, writing graffiti, building roadblocks, attending popular school, or exploding dynamite for effect, required little commitment, and were therefore carried out by civilians (Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2003, p. 564-5, Degregori 2012, p. 118).[28] Other opportunities offered by the group included (La Serna 2012, p. 148), '…cooking for the rebels; lodging them in local homes; carrying the communist flag; serving as messengers; serving as vígias (lookouts), who alerted the rebels of incoming raids from the Peruvian security forces; informing; suggesting names to be placed on Shining Path's "black list" for future sanctions; aiding in the physical punishment of Shining Path targets; and simply participating in Shining Path rallies, expeditions, incursions, and popular trials.' As suggested in this quote, the Shining Path even involved unarmed participants directly in its military actions. For example, the 1982 attack on the state-run Allpachaka farm involved more than 1,000 Shining Path followers overrunning the

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[27] My translation from Spanish.
[28] The curriculum of popular schools mostly concerned ideology rather than military tactics (La Serna 2012, p. 146).

farm's proprietors, but only a few were armed. After all resistance was suppressed, the political

commander gave a speech to the assembled participants and local peasants about the imperialism

of the United States (Del Pino 1998, p. 168, Degregori 2012, p. 128-30). Such activities provided

active roles for members that were not yet or would never become armed militants.

Governance institutions were an additional avenue through which the Shining Path

socialized the civilian population by providing opportunities for nonviolent participation. Once

the war began, the key linkage between militants and communities were the popular committees,

which served as local governance institutions that replaced the state administrative apparatus

(Weinstein 2007, p. 188), 'In rebel-held zones, the Shining Path built structures of governance

that broadened participation beyond elite intellectuals; created overlapping institutions of control

where power was shared between the military, the party, and the local administration; and drew

resources from the civilian population in manageable and accepted ways. In spite of its rejection

of national democracy, the Shining Path brought about a democratic reorganization of political

participation at the local level.'[29] The popular committees, staffed exclusively by civilians,

allowed non-combatants to become actively involved in the group and play a role in the

execution of its ideology.[30]

The central task of the popular committees was the provision of justice. Civilians would

identify culprits and recommend remedies, but Shining Path militants would carry out any

physical punishments (La Serna 2012, p. 148). While militants tended to advocate for capital

punishment in response to alleged crimes, local residents often pushed back, believing a beating

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[29] In some places, popular committees also displaced traditional, indigenous authority structures, leading to violent backlash in Huaychao and Macamba, Ayacucho Region (Del Pino 1998, p. 162).

[30] Participation in popular committees was open to both men and women, though men tended to have the more prominent roles (Cordero 1998, p. 349, 354). Interesting, the Shining Path recruited women for combatant roles at a rate likely higher than any other Communist insurgency (Lovell 2019, p. 334).

would suffice (Degregori 2012, p. 120). Such disagreements could result in significant tension between the Shining Path and local communities (La Serna 2012, p. 157). Despite these misgivings about the harshness of punishments, the Shining Path in public proclamations portrayed itself as a provider of security, in stark contrast to the Peruvian state (Degregori 2012, p. 127).

At the beginning of the insurgency, the Shining Path faced limited resistance from the state and ended up controlling most of rural Ayacucho Region. However, once the Peruvian state stepped up its counterinsurgency efforts, it forced the group to scatter and move farther and farther away from its bases of support until it fizzled in Lima's outskirts in the early 1990's. During this process, the Shining Path's violence became more intense and the ways in which they recruited and governed changed. Lacking the ability to slowly induct members and thoroughly socialize them into the ideology, the group began to rely more on the press-ganging of children who were more easily brainwashed. Funding for the popular committees also dried up, prompting resistance from participants and their slow dissolution (Del Pino 1998, p. 166-7, 173-4). These developments led to decreases in civilian participation and political education over time.

Naxalite Uprising case study

The Naxalite uprising, directed by breakaway factions from the CPI, occurred across a number of states in eastern India from 1967-1972.[31] The major sites of the uprising were Siliguri subdivision in West Bengal and Srikakulam district in Andhra Pradesh, but mobilization also

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[31] The Naxalite movement continues until today in many states in India, but the initial insurgency, controlled by a more or less consistent group of commanders, ended in 1972. The term 'Naxalite' is derived from village of Naxalbari in West Bengal, where the first attack took place in 1967. I use the term 'Naxalite' to refer to this initial group, rather than its more recent descendants.

occurred in other areas of these two states in addition to the states of Assam, Bihar, and Orissa

(Banerjee 1980, p. 140, 283, Mohanty 2015, p. 214-5).[32]

Several external developments played an important role in shaping the rebellion's

leadership. The Sino-Soviet split and the Sino-Indian War in 1962 resulted in the USSR adopting

a friendly attitude toward India and the ruling Indian National Congress (INC). Radicals within

the CPI were affronted by the USSR's accommodation of the non-communist INC, and inspired

by Maoist thought, split off to form the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI(M)) in 1964

(Paul 2014, p. 80). The results of West Bengal's state elections in 1967 also played a key role in

precipitating the uprising. For the first time since independence, the INC lost the election, and a

coalition of the Bangla Congress, the CPI and the CPI(M) formed the United Front state

government. Once again, radicals within the CPI(M) were dismayed that their leaders allied with

non-communists, but also realized that an armed uprising would put the party's leadership in a

tough position: how to maintain their revolutionary credentials without supporting an armed

campaign against landlords? This seemingly precipitous moment for CPI(M) radicals did not

actually coincide with a readiness to conduct an armed struggle, as many of its members were in

jail at the time (Paul 2014, p. 64, 77, 85).

Charu Mazumdar, who led the Siliguri committee of the CPI(M), held a conference on

March 18, 1967, calling for an armed rebellion in the village of Naxalbari.[33] Within the next two

months, almost 100 attacks on landlords and land seizures were reported to local police. These

attacks were characterized by groups of peasants, often numbering in the hundreds, marching on

landlord's homes, beating them, and re-distributing their land (Duyker 1987, p. 70). Around this

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[32] Siliguri subdivision is in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal. A district is the largest sub-state administrative unit in India, and a subdivision is the largest sub-district administrative unit.
[33] Communists had been organizing in Naxalbari since 1955 (Banerjee 1980, p. 108).

time, the nascent rebel movement controlled at least 70 square miles of territory and had set up a parallel administration in many other areas (Duyker 1987, p. 111-2, Mohanty 2015, p. 67). Attacks on police officers and police massacres of civilians brought the state firmly into the conflict and ended the Naxalites' period of uncontested control (Banerjee 1980, p. 115, Paul 2014, p. 102). Still, four months later, the rebels retained about 300 armed cadres in the area (Duyker 1987, p. 75). At this point, the movement was deeply divided both over the use of violence and the correct diagnosis of the Indian situation in Marxist terms (Banerjee 1980, p. 125-6, 167). Charu Mazumdar's faction eventually prevailed, and the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (abbreviated CPI(ML)) was formed to represent this breakaway faction (Mohanty 2015, p. 148).

As police repression dampened the rebellion in Siliguri subdivision, a new front was opened in Srikakulam district, Andhra Pradesh, in 1968, led by Nagi Reddy (Mohanty 2014, p 136). Ultimately, the Srikakulam uprising occupied a larger area and for a longer period than in Siliguri. By July 1969, the rebels controlled 300 out of 518 villages in Srikakulam district (Mohanty 2015, p. 68, 71, 80). A year later, however, police stepped up their counterinsurgency campaign, and by the end of 1970, the Srikakulam rebellion was defeated. By late 1971 and early 1972, the uprising was floundering across eastern India, and faced significant internal dissent (Banerjee 1980, p. 204, 262-3). Unable to revive the movement following Mazumdar's death shortly after his arrest in July 1972, the CPI(ML)-led Naxalite rebellion ended.

The ideology of individual Naxalites participants was varied and frequently contested within the group, but Charu Mazumdar managed to decisively win such struggles, and therefore his personal ideology in practice functioned as the Naxalites' ideology (Banerjee 1980, p. 195-7). This dynamic was furthered by the speed with which the armed struggle began, which prevented

the consolidation of a well-developed official doctrine beyond Mazumdar's own writings, and Mazumdar's authoritarian leadership style, which stymied internal debate. Most basically, Mazumdar saw enormous similarly between China on the eve of its revolution and India in 1967 (Mohanty 2015, p. 108). He understood the 'central contradiction' in India to be between the Indian people and a feudalist economic system (Banerjee 1980, p. 167). The Naxalites were a thoroughly rural movement, and while they saw peasants as their main constituency, they placed little emphasis on pre-revolutionary land reform (Mazumdar quoted in Damas 1991, p. 244, Mohanty 2015, p. 153). Changing the form of struggle due to peasant demands would dilute the revolution's force, he argued (Mazumdar quoted in Damas 1991, p. 272). This stance put the group at odds with local civilians, who may have vaguely supported a revolution, but were more interested in immediate land seizures (Banerjee 1980, p. 121).

Mazumdar was also deeply committed to underground organizing and a complete reliance on armed struggle alone (Lovell 2019, 365, Mazumdar quoted in Damas, 255-6). In his view, mobilizing civilians would invite repression (Mohanty 2015, 200), 'He disfavoured intensive propaganda before starting guerrilla actions for that would expose the attempt prematurely.' Mazumdar's theory of revolution expounded a clear, three-step process: first, kill landlords, second, encircle cities, and third, seize power at the centre (Banerjee 1980, p. 38, Mazumdar quoted in Damas 1991, p. 257-9). However, there was little planning for how each of these goals could be achieved, and echoed a very shallow reading of the progression of the Chinese Revolution (Lovell 2019, p. 365). In Mazumdar's view, armed attacks alone would spontaneously create popular support, and prior to victory, civilians' engagement was more a liability than an asset (Mazumdar quoted in Damas 1991, p. 259).

Once the armed struggle had begun, the Naxalite leadership did not make an attempt to politically educate civilians. Despite Mazumdar's stated aims to politically education combatants, this mostly did not occur outside the very top rung of leadership (Mazumdar quoted in Damas 1991, p. 244). Consequently, the group was unable to politically educate civilians. A survey of 300 CPI(ML) cadres awaiting trial in Calcutta found only 40 had studied Marx and 50 were 'well-acquainted' with Mao's thought. Furthermore, almost 240 had no political background before joining the movement (Banerjee 1980, 277). The theoretical illiteracy of Naxalites is supported by the account of a former organizer in the group, Abhijit Das. He recalls that cadres relied solely on the limited writings of Mazumdar and Mao's Little Red Book, and did not read other Marxist texts or engage in sustained ideological debate, even though advancement to the top rung of leadership did require knowledge of Marxist texts (Das 2015, p. 153, Mohanty 2015, p. 149-50, 227). This aversion to political education, both of combatants and civilians, was derived from Mazumdar's authoritarian leadership style and opposition to education in general, which he saw not merely as useless but as actively dangerous.[34] He called on followers to leave school and burn textbooks, both of which he saw as furthering a capitalist mindset (Paul 2014, p. 105-6). The de-valuing of education may have made it difficult to socialize new members into the movement, but it did bolster Mazumdar's undisputed position as the theoretical mastermind of the Naxalite cause.

The policy of annihilation, championed by Charu Mazumdar, characterized the strategy of violence employed by the CPI(ML). Though ostensibly a tactic, it formed a central component

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[34] Abhijit Das (2015, p. 155) recalled a debate over whether or not to create mass movements with a former comrade, 'Comrades, we have no time to waste in all this useless debate. We are at war. Either we will destroy the enemy, or the enemy will destroy us. The last thing I have to say is that Comrade Abhijit's view that guerilla warfare is not the only form of class struggle, that legal and extra-legal battles need to be fought, that economic struggles must be continued goes against the thoughts of the party. This is C[haru]M[azumdar]'s party, and those who do not accept his leadership unconditionally have no place in the Party now.' The brackets are my addition.

of the Naxalites' ideology (Mohanty 2015, p. 109). Annihilation referred to the killing of class enemies, which in rural areas, generally meant police and landlords. Mazumdar (quoted in Mohanty 2015, p. 109) saw annihilation as a, 'higher former of class struggle and the beginning of guerrilla warfare.' In his mind, annihilation laid the groundwork for future propaganda and economic claims (Banerjee 1980, p. 87-8).

Not only was annihilation central to Mazumdar's tactics, but it was pursued at the expense of all others, which meant civilians lacked opportunities for nonviolent participation in the movement. Mazumdar opposed the creation of a mass movement, meaning the creation of non-military organizations, including peasant and trade unions. In his words (quoted in Banerjee 1980, p. 168), '…if everyone starts building mass organizations, who is to build up the underground party organization? Do we expect the mass organization to organize the agrarian revolution?' The lack of mass movements in the organization meant the Naxalites lacked institutions in which its combatants and civilian supporters could participate in together, furthering separating leadership and masses. Unlike the Shining Path, which used teachers in rural areas as the link between the vanguard and civilians, the Naxalites' interactions with civilians were not institutionalized (Banerjee 1980, p. 203). Consequently, an internal report by the Naxalites in Srikakulam concluded the group has failed to effectively reach out to peasants (quoted in Banerjee 1980, p. 209), 'Even today our party is dominated by the petty bourgeoisie. Even today the villages of poor and landless peasants are not the centres of our activity…In the villages we still take shelters [sic] in petty bourgeoisie and rich peasant houses and enquire whether any poor peasant is prepared to "cooperate" with us.'

Mazumdar pejoratively deemed the mass movement approach as 'economism' which was to be avoided at all costs.[35] In short, Mazumdar (quoted in Damas 1991, p. 269) feared that any pre-victory improvement in peasants' economic conditions would dilute their willingness to support the Naxalites' revolution. Despite Mazumdar's fierce opposition to economism, there is little evidence that the limited civilian participation that did occur was coerced (Duyker 1987, p. 109). Even if the CPI(ML) and its predecessor faction refused to create a mass movement, the annihilation policy at least allowed the opportunity to temporarily seize much-needed land. The movement also offered the chance to upend oppressive social structures, which as Wood argues, can prove a powerful motivating device despite the inherent risks (Wood 2003, Banerjee 2012, p. 121).

Conclusion

In this article, I argue that whether armed groups socialize civilians is determined by two necessary but not sufficient conditions and two variables. For socialization to occur, civilians must not already be mobilized in support of the armed group for socialization to be required, and combatants must be themselves ideological socialized to be able to socialize civilians. Then, if group leadership values reading- and writing-based education they are likely to politically educate civilians, and if they see civilian participation as strategically crucial to victory, they will create opportunities for nonviolent civilian participation. Whether group leadership values education and civilian participation is dependent on the specific leadership backgrounds as demonstrated in the two historical case studies, and my argument does not generalize on this point.

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[35] Some CPI(ML) members did attempt to organize mass actions, such as Kanu Sanyal and one faction of the Bihari CPI(ML), but they lacked institutional support (Banerjee 1980, p. 326-7, Paul 2014, p. 89).

This paper makes three main contributions to the study of civil war. First, it argues that the ideological socialization of civilians is an institution of rebel governance worthy of study, just as scholars have previously studied institutions like justice provision and service distribution. Second, it demonstrates that the intensity of civilian socialization varies in ways not explained by current theories of rebel governance, and proposes a novel theory to explain this variation. Finally, the paper makes the case for the unbundling of armed group ideologies. Instead of comparing groups that are broadly in the same ideological category, such as Marxist or Islamist, it is important to pay attention to the specific differences and similarities across groups' ideas. While groups may share many of the same allegiances and appear outwardly similar, the specific backgrounds of leaders and how they interpret doctrines can have major effects on the group's behaviour. Finally, future work should investigate not only the determinants of variation in socialization intensity across a wider range of groups, but also propose and test theories that explain variation in the success of socialization in changing the ways civilians think and act politically.

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